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OUTLOOK AND APPRAISAL 
The revival in economic activity in Scotland which occurred in 1978 is unlikely 
to be maintained during 1979. The fairly limited expansion which did occur in 
1978 was largely a response to substantial increases in real disposable income. 
Between April 1977 and April 1978, average male earnings in Scotland rose from 
£78.3 to £88.5 per week, a rise of 13.0%. Over the same period, retail prices 
in the UK rose by only 7.9%, largely in response to the stability of the pound, 
which in turn reflected the more conservative monetary stance which the 
government had been forced to adopt. Tax handouts in the April 1978 budget 
amounting to some £2bn further boosted real disposable incomes. Consequently, 
retail sales expanded substantially and the average weekly expenditure of 
Scottish households rose considerably above the 1977 figure of £64.81. 
During 1979, the opportunity to further expand real incomes will be considerably 
reduced. Earnings growth will be less than the 13% of 1978, unless the present 
difficulties cause a complete breakdown of wage restraint, and inflation will 
tend to rise slightly towards the end of the year. Further, there will be 
little, if any, scope for tax cuts if the public sector borrowing requirement 
is to be kept to its target of £8Jbn for the fiscal year 1979/80. Indeed, 
some tax increases may be necessary, though they are unlikely to be implemented 
before an election. 
Though consumption growth may be constrained, the outlook for investment appears 
to be more hopeful. The Scottish Council expect manufacturing investment to 
xotal £575tn in 1979, which is a considerable increase on the most recent actual 
figure of £377.5m for 1976, even allowing for inflation. This is perhaps a 
response to increased levels of output requiring the installation of new capacity. 
Certainly the CBI Survey of October last shows 44% of firms working at full 
capacity. However, with MLR now at 12J% there are certainly strong financial 
disincentives to investment. Additionally, with corporate profits beginning 
to decline somewhat after a strong recovery at the beginning of the upswing, the 
scope for internally financed investment should begin to close down in the 
latter half of 1979. 
Prospects for employment are only moderate. Between June 1977 and June 1978 
there is estimated to have been an increase of only 1000 in total Scottish 
employment. As usual, the sectoral pattern of change has been a further decline 
in manufacturing employment being offset by an increase in the service sector. 
The results of the Scottish Council survey,coupled with the argument that 
employment tends to peak after production because of various inefficiencies in 
the operation of the labour market, provides some grounds for expecting a very 
slight increase in employment over the year. Consequently, unemployment should 
continue to decline very slowly, reaching around 157,000 (seasonally adjusted) 
by June. The most depressing feature of this forecast is that this may well 
be the minimum level of unemployment to occur during the current economic cycle, 
even though it exceeds the maxima of all previous post-war economic cycles in 
Scotland. 
At the t.irne of "Titinp, industrial disruption ir threatening seriously t> reduce production and 
so cause significant short-term increases in unemployment. Perhaps it is 
surprising that such disruption should take place after a year in which real 
incomes increased substantially for the first time since 1973. However, since 
it has become clear that the government's 5% guideline carries no official 
sanction, a number of unions, some with justifiable grievances following the 
inequities of four years of pay policy, have sought pay increases which, on 
even the most pessimistic forecasts of inflation, would give increases in real 
wages substantially in excess of the growth of output. Assuming the government 
maintains a tight monetary policy, the inevitable result of acquiescence to these 
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wage demands will be substantial increases in unemployment. Our current 
forecasts are based on the assumption that earnings will grow by about 10% in 
1979. Should this figure be exceeded by a large margin, which now certainly 
seems possible, the outlook for unemployment is considerably more pessimistic. 
The government is now in a very difficult position. Further attempts to curb 
wage demands are, following the settlement at Ford's, unlikely to meet with 
success. Deflationary policies would be very unpopular during an election 
year and, even though they might reduce earnings growth, almost inevitably would 
cause an increase in unemployment. Price controls are unlikely to be of much 
value in curbing price inflation except in the very short-run, and may cut 
deeply into investment programs. If there is an early election, reflation will 
nrcbably aupear to be the most effective ontier'available to the re-' "cverrment. 
Crowing- exchange rate and balance of payrrents difficulties are likely to make its 
imposition inevitable anyway. 
European Monetary System 
In a special article in this Commentary, Bill Stewart of the Economics Department, 
University of Strathclyde, discusses the background to, and the structure of, 
the European Monetary System. In Scotland, this issue may seem rather remote, 
especially since the UK government has decided not to enter the scheme, at 
least initially. Certainly, the structure of the system is labyrinthine in 
its complexity. Nevertheless, EMS and the prospect of further monetary 
integration in Europe are of fundamental importance to the Scottish economy. 
As the article shows, the balance of advantage between entry to EMS and the 
status quo is by no means clear-cut. Which particular strategy one favours 
depends on one's view of the future performance of the British economy and the 
ability of the government to deal with economic problems, particularly inflation. 
For instance, if the UK government could reduce inflation to West German rates 
there would be little pressure on the exchange markets to sell sterling and buy 
Deutschmarks. Consequently, the pound would be able to remain within the limits 
prescribed in EMS and the country might well benefit because stability would 
boost investors' confidence. Conversely, if the UK entered EMS and found 
itself unable to reduce its relative inflation rate, pressure on sterling might 
force deflationary measures on an unwilling government. These might involve 
restrictive monetary policies such as increases in interest rates to attract 
foreign exchange into sterling and/or tight fiscal policies to deflate the 
domestic economy. Some would argue that deflation would be inevitable no matter 
what structure the international currency markets take. But opinion on this 
matter is divided, especially with regard to the extent and timing of the 
adjustment, 
Past experience has shown that deflationary policies do not affect each part of 
the country evenly. The 'development areas', of which Scotland is one, generally 
suffer more acutely during a recession, especially in terms of higher unemployment. 
Those of the 'demand deficiency' school of regional analysis would argue that 
what is required to restore these regions to full-employment is a reduction in 
real wages so that product prices drop and consequently, output (due to increased 
external demand) rises. In effect, this is identically what happens to a 
country as a whole when it devalues its currency. Relative to other states, 
the devaluation reduces costs, enabling price cuts and consequent export expansion. 
Of course, since all the UK regions form a monetary union, devaluation is not an 
available option for the depressed regions. However, the UK government has 
pursued policies which can be looked on as a 'transfer of resources' from the 
wealthy to the poorer regions or alternatively as an effective devaluation of 
their 'currency' For instant, the Regional Employment Premium reduced relative 
manufacturing costs by subsidising labour costs in the development areas, so 
giving producers freedom to reduce relative prices. Investment grants effectively 
transfer resources from central government to expanding firms in the poorer 
regions, again partly with the intention of reducing their relative costs. 
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It is probably the case that, in the absence of resource transfer to the 
development areas, severe strain would be put on the political cohesion of the 
United Kingdom, simple because, rightly or wrongly, the concensus opinion now 
is that it is the government's duty to maintain a reasonable degree of equity 
between regions. Such a concensus on resource transfer has yet to emerge in 
Europe as a whole. Until it does, the political commitment of the poorer 
European nations (especially the UK) to the European Monetary System will be 
understandably weak. 
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